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"there will be situations where a Federal income tax
deficiency will not be as narrowly focused" and that interest
paid on a tax deficiency may not be an ordinary and
necessary business expense.27 The court specifically noted
that Miller I and Miller II involved just such a situation.28
The Tax Court was badly divided in Redlark.29 Eight
judges agreed with the majority opinion, six dissented and
several wrote concurring opinions.
In conclusion
At the moment, for taxpayers in the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals area, the regulation has been declared valid.30
Outside the Eighth Circuit, the Tax Court view prevails that
the temporary regulation is invalid but that the interest must
be an ordinary and necessary business expense to be
deductible.31
But Redlark 32 may be appealed. In any event, the last
word has probably not been written on this issue.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff's
car struck a horse on a highway. The horse belonged to the
defendant and had escaped after a parked truck rolled down
a slope and crashed through the fence holding the horse. The
evidence demonstrated that, except for the breach in the
fence caused by the truck, the fence was in good repair and
sufficient to prevent the horse from escaping. Although the
jury found for the plaintiff, the trial court entered judgment
for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict because the
evidence showed that the fence was in good repair. The
appellate court affirmed, agreeing that no evidence was
presented that the defendant or any agent, employee or
resident of the defendant was responsible for the breach in
the fence. The evidence showed that the truck was parked
on a slope in gear and with its parking brake engaged. After
the accident, the truck was out of gear and the parking brake
was off. Butcher v. White's Iowa Institute, 541 N.W.2d
262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor was a
corporation which operated a feedlot. The corporation was
wholly-owned by the defendant who was also the president
and principal employee of the debtor. The defendant was
convicted of a check kiting scheme using the debtor's funds.
The trustee sought to recover prepetition payments made to
creditors during the check kiting as fraudulent transfers. The
trustee argued that the defendant's guilty plea in the check
kiting case was prima facie evidence that the payments to
creditors were made with intent to defraud creditors. The
court held that the guilty plea was prima facie evidence of
intent to defraud only as to the two banks used in the check
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kiting scheme and that the defendant's intent as to the other
creditors' payments was an issue of fact which precluded
summary judgment on the issue of recovery of the payments
as fraudulent transfers. In re KZK Livestock, Inc., 190
B.R. 626 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned 80 acres of rural
land which included 78 acres used for the residence and
cultivation and two acres used for an auto repair business.
The debtors claimed the entire 80 acres as an exempt rural
homestead. The trustee objected, arguing that the homestead
exemption, Okla. Stat. tit. 31, § 2, limits the exemption to
$5,000 where the homestead is also used for a business. The
court noted that the cases which agreed with the trustee's
argument involved only homesteads within city limits. The
court held that the business use limitation did not apply to
rural homesteads, based on statutory construction of the
homestead exemption statute which appeared to distinguish
between rural and city homesteads for purposes of the
business limitation. As the debtor noted, the trustee's
argument would deny a rural homestead exemption to all
farms and ranches. In re Ward, 190 B.R. 427 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL. A creditor had obtained a pre-petition
judgment against the debtors and had docketed the
judgment, creating a judgment lien against the debtors'
property. The debtors subsequently filed for Chapter 12 and
obtained a ruling voiding the judgment lien under Section
547. The Chapter 12 case was dismissed by the debtors and
the debtors filed for Chapter 11 with the case eventually
converted to Chapter 7. After the debtors received a
discharge in the Chapter 7 case, the judgment creditor
sought to vacate the Chapter 12 order voiding the judgment
lien. The court held that, upon dismissal, a voided lien is
automatically reinstated unless the debtors seek an order not
to reinstate the lien; therefore, the burden is on the debtors
to demonstrate a reason for not reinstating of the lien. In
addition, the court held that the discharge in Chapter 7 had
no effect on the reinstatement of the lien because the debtors
did not seek an order not to reinstate the lien and because a
discharge only affects the debtors' personal liability as to a
lien and not the enforcement of the lien against property.
The debtors also argued that the creditor had entered into a
stipulation which was the basis of the original lien
avoidance and which estopped the creditor from reinstating
the lien. The court held that this issue could best be resolved
in a state court when the creditor sought to enforce the lien.
Finally, the court held that the debtors failed to demonstrate
any unfairness to other creditors from allowing the
reinstatement of the lien; therefore, the lien was reinstated
by the Chapter 12 dismissal. In re Derrick, 190 B.R. 346
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995).
PLAN. The debtors operated a citrus farm which had
produced 3,800 boxes of fruit. The debtors had planted an
additional 20 acres of new trees and projected steady
increases in the number of boxes of fruit to be harvested
during the Chapter 12 plan years with the third year
producing almost three times as many boxes of fruit than the
farm produced historically. The debtors did not plan any
additional labor or equipment costs to cover the increased
maintenance and harvesting costs of the additional fruit.The
plan also provided only $480 per month for living expenses
for three people, two residences and two automobiles. The
court held that the plan was not confirmable because it was
not feasible since the plan was overly optimistic about
increased harvests from new trees without additional labor
or equipment. The court also held that the plan failed to
provide sufficient living expenses or provide any buffer
against unexpected difficulties. In re Gough, 190 B.R. 455
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. After the taxpayer filed for
Chapter 7, the IRS sent the taxpayer a Notice of Proposed
Assessment of the 100 percent penalty under I.R.C. § 6672
as a responsible person of a corporation which failed to pay
employment taxes. The notice provided that if the debtor
failed to protest the notice, the IRS would proceed with the
assessment of the penalty. The court held that the notice was
an attempt to initiate an assessment of a penalty and was
void as a violation of the automatic stay. Riley v. Comm'r,
96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,090 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
DISCHARGE. The debtors owed taxes for 1989. In
December 1990, the debtors filed for Chapter 13 and the
case continued until it was dismissed in June 1992. The IRS
assessed the debtors for the unpaid 1989 taxes more than
240 days before the instant bankruptcy case was filed. The
IRS argued that, under Section 108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h),
the intervening Chapter 13 case tolled the provisions in
Sections 507(a)(8) and 523(a)(8)(B) which provide that
taxes due more than three years prior to the bankruptcy
filing were dischargeable. The court held that I.R.C. §
108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h) apply to toll the three year
period of Section 507(a)(8) during the intervening Chapter
13 case; therefore, the 1989 taxes were nondischargeable
because the tax return was due within three non-tolled years
before the petition for the current case. In re Shedd, 190
B.R. 692 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. The debtor had
made several payments of employment taxes to the IRS
within 90 days before filing the Chapter 11 petition. The
payments were not designated by the debtor and the IRS
applied the payments to non-trust fund taxes owed by the
debtor. The debtor sought to avoid and recover the
payments as preferential under Section 547(b). The court
found that the debtor was insolvent during the 90 day pre-
petition period, the payments were made for the benefit of
the IRS, and the IRS received more than it would have if the
debtor filed for Chapter 7 before the payments were made.
The court held, however, that the debtor had a beneficial
interest in the payments only to the extent the payment
represented the debtor's share of the social security tax on
the wages paid. In addition, the court held that the payments
were not made for an antecedent debt but were made for
taxes due after the payments were made (an employer's
social security taxes are due at the end of the employment
quarter); therefore, the payments were not preferential under
Section 547(b). After reconsideration, the court held that the
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payments made after the date for which penalties would be
assessed were payments made for an antecedent debt and
were recoverable as preferential transfers. The IRS also
argued that the late payments were excepted from the
preferential transfer rules in that the payments were made in
the ordinary course of business. The court held that the
debtor had a history of making timely payments; therefore,
the late payments were not made in the ordinary course of
business. In re Pullman Const. Industries, Inc., 190 B.R.
618 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), aff'g in part and rev'g in part
on reconsideration, 186 B.R. 88 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
CONTRACTS
MERCHANT. The plaintiff was a university which
purchased a grain dryer for use on its research farms. The
defendant had manufactured a part in the dryer which failed,
causing a fire which damaged the plaintiff's property. The
plaintiff sued in tort for damages to the other property and
the defendant argued that the action was barred by Minn.
Stat. § 604.10(a) because the purchase was made between
merchants in the goods involved. The court held that the
university was a merchant with respect to the dryer because
(1) the university had purchased six units prior to the dryer
involved, (2) the university was a sophisticated buyer and
used a bid process, and (3) the university used an expert on
grain dryers to make the purchase. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Minn. v. Chief Industries, 907 F. Supp. 1298 (D.
Minn. 1995).
RELEASE. The plaintiff had contracted with the
defendant for the defendant to provide and apply fertilizer
and the herbicide Treflan to 19 acres of safflower. The
applicator hired by the defendant failed to properly clean the
herbicide applicator equipment and the herbicide Velpar
contaminated the fields, causing immediate damage to the
safflower fields. The parties negotiated payment for the
damage and the plaintiff signed a release which held the
defendant harmless for "any and all damages caused by the
spraying of my approximate nineteen acres of safflower."
The plaintiff sued for breach of contract when it became
clear that the contamination continued in subsequent crop
years. The defendant first argued that the action was barred
by the statute of limitations on tort actions. The court held
that the action was not barred by the statute of limitation for
tort actions because the plaintiff's petition raised no tort
issues and the facts and claims alleged by the plaintiff were
consistent with a breach of contract action. The plaintiff
sought to overcome the release by oral extrinsic evidence
that the parties intended the release to apply only to the
safflower crop and not to subsequent crops. The defendant
argued that the statute of frauds prevented any extrinsic
evidence. The court held that the language quoted above
was sufficiently ambiguous to allow extrinsic evidence on
the issue of the crop years covered by the release. Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
PESTICIDES. See Hochberg v. Zoecon Corp. infra
under Products Liability.
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. The decedent's
estate included a QTIP trust received from the decedent's
predeceased spouse. The decedent's will provided that "all
transfer, estate or inheritance taxes…imposed by any taxing
authority upon or in relation to…any trust…included as part
of my taxable estate, shall be paid as an expense out of my
residuary estate." The estate had claimed the taxes
attributable to the QTIP trust against the trust but the IRS
argued that the will provision controlled and the taxes had to
be paid out of the residuary estate, lessening charitable
distributions from the residuary estate. Under Ohio Rev.
Code § 2113.86(l), "the estate is entitled to recover from the
persons holding or receiving the property any amount by
which the estate tax payable exceeds the estate tax that
would have been payable if the value of the property had not
been included in the gross estate of the decedent. This
division does not apply if a decedent provides otherwise in
his will or another governing instrument and the will or
instrument refers to either section mentioned in this division
or to qualified terminable interest marital deduction
property." The court held that Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.86(l)
required the decedent's will to specifically mention the
QTIP trust as relieved from its share of estate tax and that
the will's use of the term "any trust" was not specific enough
to change the presumption that estate tax attributable to the
QTIP trust was to be charged to the trust. Estate of
Vahlteich v. Comm'r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 60,218 (6th
Cir. 1995).
The decedent was the beneficiary of a QTIP trust
established by the will of the predeceased spouse. Under the
trust, at the decedent's death accumulated income passed to
the decedent's estate and principal passed as directed by the
predeceased spouse's will. The decedent's will contained a
general "pay-all-taxes" clause which provided that the estate
was to pay all estate and inheritance taxes "without seeking
reimbursement from or charging any person therefor." The
estate reduced the amounts paid to the trust remainder
beneficiaries by the amount of estate and inheritance taxes
attributed to the inclusion of the QTIP trust in the decedent's
estate. The beneficiaries objected, arguing that the "pay-all-
taxes" clause relieved the trust from charges for the taxes
relating to the trust. The court held that because the "pay-
all-taxes" clause did not specifically mention nonprobate
property or the QTIP trust, the QTIP trust was responsible
for the estate and inheritance taxes attributable to the trust.
The court noted that there was no evidence that the decedent
intended to benefit the remainder beneficiaries of the
predeceased spouse's bequest at the expense of the
decedent's specific bequests. Matter of Will of Cooney,
541 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. 1995).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* In December 1983, the grantors created an
irrevocable trust for their child. The trust provided for the
child to have a special power of appointment to appoint by
will the trust corpus to the child's heirs or to the grantors'
heirs. If the power of appointment was not exercised the
trust passed to the child's heirs, or if no heirs survived, to the
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grantors' heirs. The trust could not be extended more than
21 years past the death of the last survivor of the heirs living
in December 1983. The child had executed a will which
appointed the trust to separate trusts for the child's heirs.
The IRS ruled that the trust was not subject to GSTT
because (1) it was irrevocable prior to September 25, 1985,
(2) the power of appointment was not exercised in a manner
which extended the life of the trust more than 21 years after
the death of a person living in December 1983, and (3) the
exercise of the power of appointment did not constitute a
constructive addition to the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9607011, Nov.
9, 1995.
IRA. The decedent's estate included an IRA which had a
trust as the remainder beneficiary. The trust provided that it
was to be split into a marital trust and a residuary trust with
the surviving spouse as the beneficiary and one of two
cotrustees of both trusts. The marital trust was to be funded
with the lesser of the maximum estate tax marital deduction
or the amount necessary to reduce the estate tax to zero. The
surviving spouse had the power to withdraw any marital
trust property. The surviving spouse and the other cotrustee
allocated the maximum amount of the IRA to the marital
trust and then the surviving spouse withdrew the IRA funds
and placed them in the surviving spouse's own IRA within
60 days. The IRS noted that the general rule is that the
transfer of IRA funds to a third party would prevent the
surviving spouse from rolling the funds over to another IRA
without penalty. However, because the original trust was a
beneficiary of the decedent's IRA, the surviving spouse
would be treated as having received the IRA funds from the
decedent and the rollover of the funds to the surviving
spouse's IRA would not cause the IRA funds to be included
in the surviving spouse's gross income. Ltr. Rul. 9608036,
Nov. 29, 1995.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. An irrevocable trust
was created in 1974 by a now-deceased grantor. The trust
provided for two individuals and one corporation as trustees.
One of the trustees died and the remaining individual trustee
appointed the grandchildren of the original grantor as co-
trustees and amended the trust to provide that if an
individual trustee removes the corporate trustee, the
successor corporate trustee cannot be related or subordinate
to the individual trustee. The IRS ruled that the new trustees
did not have a power of appointment over trust principal.
The IRS noted that its original position, as stated in Rev.
Rul. 79-353, 1972-2 C.B. 325, has been changed by Rev.
Rul. 95-58, I.R.B. 1995-36, 16, to provide that individual
trustees do not have a power of appointment over trust
principal where the trustee has the power to remove and
replace another trustee so long as the successor trustee is not
related or subordinate to the trustee. Ltr. Rul. 9607008,
Nov. 9, 1995.
TRUSTS. The plaintiffs transferred their residence to a
ten-year qualified personal residence trust as part of their
estate planning. The trust provided that the plaintiffs
retained a right to live on the property during the term of the
trust. The plaintiffs were the cotrustees of the trust and as
cotrustees applied for a homestead exemption from ad
valorem state taxes in Florida. The county appraiser rejected
the homestead exemption, arguing that the residence was
not permanent because the plaintiffs only had the right to
live on the property for a maximum of ten years. The court
held that the exemption statute had no time limit for
residency of the permanent resident and only required a
beneficial interest in the property by the person claiming the
exemption. The court held that a residence in a QPRT was
eligible for the exemption. Robbins v. Welbaum, 664
So.2d 1 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
VALUATION. The decedent had received a portion of
the predeceased spouse's estate in a QTIP trust. After the
death of the predeceased spouse, the estate and the decedent
formed two partnerships funded with the estate property and
the decedent's own property. The estate then funded the
QTIP trust with its shares of the partnerships; thus, the
decedent owned a portion of the partnerships in fee and a
portion through the QTIP trust. The IRS ruled that the
partnership interests were to be aggregated for purposes of
valuation for estate tax purposes in the decedent's estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9608001, Aug. 18, 1995.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS . A corporation was not
allowed deductions for repairs made to a house owned by
the corporation but used by the corporation’s sole
shareholder as a residence. The court held that the
deductions were disallowed because the repairs benefitted
only the shareholder. In addition, the court held that the
repairs constituted constructive dividends to the shareholder.
Gill v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-92, aff'd, __ F.3d __
(6th Cir. 1996).
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
CONVERSION. The Treasury Department has
announced that it will propose legislation which would
amend I.R.C. § 1374 to treat a conversion of a C corporation
to an S corporation aa a liquidation taxable at the corporate
level followed by contribution of the assets to the S
corporation. The new law would be effective only for tax
years after Janury 1, 1997. TDNR RR-885.
LIQUIDATION. The taxpayer was the sole shareholder
of a corporation which operated a campground and concert
park. Because of litigation problems with the local
government, the taxpayer decided to sell the property and
purchase an amusement park elsewhere. A second
corporation was formed for the purpose of acquiring the
new property. The corporation's property was sold and on
the advice of the corporation's accountant, the corporation
was dissolved under state law, final income tax returns were
filed and distributions were made to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer originally listed these distributions as liquidating
distributions from the corporation but later filed an amended
return which did not include the distributions in income.
The taxpayer argued that the distributions were part of a
reorganization of the original corporation. The court held
that the distributions were taxable as liquidating
distributions because a clear intent to liquidate the first
corporation was demonstrated by the (1) recitations in the
board meeting minutes that the corporation was to liquidate
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in accordance with the accountant's advice, (2) the
corporation filed final income tax returns, (3) the
corporation dissolved under state law, and (4) the
corporation sold all of its assets. Murphy v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-59.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The taxpayers, husband and wife, were the sole
shareholders of a C corporation which operated a national
delivery service. The corporation made several distributions
to the taxpayers which were characterized on the
corporation's books as loans. The corporation had also
prepared interest-bearing notes to bolster the evidence that
the distributions were loans. During an IRS audit of the
corporation's returns, the corporation and taxpayers took the
position that the distributions were loans to the taxpayers.
Some of the funds were repaid by the taxpayers but most of
the distributions were eventually written off by the
corporation. The corporation, however, characterized the
written off amounts as dividends and not as loans. The court
held that the write off of the distributions resulted in
discharge of indebtedness income to the taxpayers because
the taxpayers had claimed the distributions as loans in the
audits. The court noted that the taxpayers had consistently
claimed the distributions as loans until the statute of
limitations had closed on the tax years involved. Schneller
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-62.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
owned a small pet shop business which had experienced at
least seven straight years of losses. The taxpayer also had
full time employment elsewhere but did not receive a high
income from that job. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer
did not have a profit motive in operating the store because
the taxpayer did not maintain an accurate recordkeeping
system and did little to increase the store's profitability. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the Tax Court did not
give sufficient weight to other factors involved in the case,
such as the taxpayer's modest income from other sources
and the taxpayer's moving of the store to a more favorable
location. On remand, the Tax Court affirmed its holding
after reviewing all nine factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b).
The court acknowledged that the employment of the
taxpayer's parent in the store could be considered
involvement by the taxpayer but the court held that the
parent's employment was primarily for the personal pleasure
of the parent and for the taxpayer's satisfaction of finding
employment for the parent. The Tax Court also held that the
taxpayer's relocation of the store did not indicate a profit
motive because the taxpayer did not attempt to move the
store earlier when several years of losses had already
occurred. The Tax Court did acknowledge that the
taxpayer's modest income from other sources demonstrated
that the store was not operated primarily as a tax shelter of
the other income but held that this factor did not outweigh
the other indicators that strongly showed no profit motive in
operating the store.  Ranciato v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1996-67, on rem. from, 52 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'g
and rem'g, T.C. Memo. 1993-536.
The taxpayer had owned and operated a 150 acre farm
for 37 years, with 36 of those years producing losses. The
case involved only three of those years. In the first year, the
taxpayer accepted a teaching job in another state which
required the employment of caretakers and neighbors to
attend the farm because the taxpayer was required to live in
the other state. In holding that the farm was not operated
with the intent to make a profit, the court examined the nine
factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b): (1) the taxpayer failed to
keep records sufficient to evaluate the future success or
failure of the operation and failed to make changes that
would make the operation profitable; (2) the taxpayer had
sufficient expertise to run the farm profitably; (3) the
taxpayer spent little time on the farm during the tax years
involved and the caretakers also spent little time in watching
the farm; (4) the taxpayer had not made any other
businesses profitable; (5) the farm had a long history of
losses; (6) even though some expenses were unexpected, the
absence of those losses would not have made the farm
profitable; (7) although the land appeared to have
appreciated during the taxpayer's ownership, the taxpayer
failed to show that the appreciation exceeded the losses; (8)
the farm losses generated substantial tax benefits from
offsetting the taxpayer's nonfarm income; and (9) the
taxpayer's operation of a nonprofitable farm for 37 years
indicated that the taxpayer operated the farm primarily for
pleasure. Pearson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-66.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayers
were limited partners who held 0.45 percent interests in a
limited partnership with more than 100 partners; therefore,
the taxpayers were non-notice partners who did not receive
notice of an administrative adjustment filed with the tax
matters partner (TMP). The TMP signed a settlement
agreement which adjusted several items of partnership
deductions which passed through to the taxpayers and
resulted in deficiencies owed by the taxpayers. The
taxpayers challenged the administrative adjustment of
partnership items and the IRS moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the Tax Court did not have
jurisdiction over any challenge of the adjustments, except
for mathematical errors. The Tax Court agreed with the IRS,
holding that, because the taxpayers held less than a 1
percent interest in a partnership with more than 100
partners, the taxpayers were not required to receive notice of
the administrative adjustment and were bound by the
settlement agreed to by the TMP. Vander Heide v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-74.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT LOSSES. The taxpayers
owned several condominiums which were rented to third
parties during the summer. The properties were managed by
a management company which obtained the renters, cleaned
the condominiums after each use and maintained the
properties. The taxpayers claimed to have spent over 100
hours per year in maintenance of the condominiums,
including repainting and cleaning. The court held that the
losses from the rental activity of the condominiums were
subject to the passive loss rules because (1) the taxpayers
did not perform substantially all the participation in the
operation of the rental activity since the management
company provided many services; (2) the taxpayers did not
preform more services than the management company, and
(3) the taxpayers did not participate in the rental activity on
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a regular, continuous and substantial basis during the year.
Chapin v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-56.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February
1996, the weighted average is 7.01 percent with the
permissible range of 6.31 to 7.57 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.31 to 7.71 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-
11.
The decedent owned an interest in a qualified pension
plan and an IRA. The surviving spouse was the beneficiary
of both plans and elected to have the funds in the pension
plan rolled over to the IRA and elected not to have the IRA
transferred to the surviving spouse's name. The IRS ruled
that the surviving spouse did not recognize income from the
rollover of the pension plan funds to the IRA, distributions
from the IRA to the surviving spouse prior to the date that
the surviving spouse reached age 59 1/2 were not subject to
the 10 percent early distributions tax, and the IRA would not
be treated as the surviving spouse's IRA. Ltr. Rul. 9608042,
Dec. 1, 1995.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
March 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.05 4.99 4.96 4.94
110% AFR 5.57 5.49 5.45 5.43
120% AFR 6.08 5.99 5.95 5.92
Mid-term
AFR 5.45 5.38 5.34 5.32
110% AFR 6.01 5.92 5.88 5.85
120% AFR 6.56 6.46 6.41 6.37
Long-term
AFR 6.07 5.98 5.94 5.91
110% AFR 6.69 6.58 6.53 6.49
120% AFR 7.31 7.18 7.12 7.07
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. An S corporation
amended its articles of incorporation to provide for two
classes of stock, preferred stock and common stock. The
two classes had different voting and economic rights. The
corporation did not realize that the creation of the two
classes of stock would terminate the Subchapter S
corporation election until informed by counsel. The
corporation immediately amended the articles of
incorporation to eliminate the second class of stock. The
IRS ruled that the termination of the S corporation status
would be waived as inadvertent. Ltr. Rul. 9608012, Nov.
13, 1995.
STOCK REDEMPTION. The taxpayers were
beneficiaries of a QSST trust which held S corporation
stock. The S corporation had accumulated earnings and
profits from its years as a C corporation. The corporation
redeemed stock in the trust for cash equal to the fair market
value of the stock.  The corporation did not plan to issue,
redeem or exchange any additional stock and no other
shareholder was required to purchase the redeemed stock.
The IRS ruled that because the reduction in the trust's share
of stock in the corporation was not a meaningful reduction,
the redemption of the stock was essentially equivalent to a
dividend. The IRS also ruled that (1) the distribution to the
trust was not included in the trust's income to the extent the
distributions did not exceed the accumulated adjustments
account at the close of the tax year and did not exceed the
trust's basis in the stock; (2) the basis of the redeemed
shares was decreased by the amount of the distribution; (3)
if the distribution exceeded the aggregate basis of the
redeemed shares, the excess distribution decreased the basis
of the remaining shares held by the trust; and (4) if the
distribution was less than the aggregate basis of the
redeemed shares, the remaining basis in the redeemed shares
increased the basis of the remaining shares held by the trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9607003, Nov. 3, 1995.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer operated a tree
trimming business and claimed expenses, primarily fuel
expenses, for operating a truck in the business. The taxpayer
provided only charge slips for fuel purchased at a gasoline
station. However, the taxpayer presented no evidence that
the charges were paid during the taxable year or that the fuel
was used in the business; therefore, the court held that the
expenses could not be claimed in excess of the amount
allowed by the IRS. Fritz v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-
73.
WITHHOLDING TAXES . The taxpayer owned 50
percent of two corporations and was employed by the
corporations. The taxpayer retired from the employment
positions with the corporations and entered into an
agreement for the repurchase of the stock by the
corporations. The corporations also agreed to provide the
taxpayer with weekly payments for 10 years as
consideration for the taxpayer's past services to the
corporations. If the taxpayer died before the end of the 10
years, the remaining payments would be made to the
taxpayer's spouse. The IRS ruled that the payments would
be wages for purposes I.R.C. § 3401 and would be subject
to employment taxes. The IRS also ruled that the taxpayer
could not elect to have no withholding under I.R.C. § 3405
because the payments were wages under I.R.C. § 3401. Ltr.
Rul. 9607009, Nov. 9, 1995.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
PESTICIDES. The plaintiff was injured after using a
pesticide manufactured by the defendant. The pesticide was
a dip used to remove fleas from the plaintiff's dogs. The
plaintiff did not wear protective clothing and suffered injury
from skin exposure to the pesticide. The plaintiff sued for
negligence and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability. The defendant argued that the actions were
prevented by the preemption of FIFRA because the actions
were based on a failure to warn. The court held that the
actions were preempted by FIFRA. Hochberg v. Zoecon
Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1995).
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TRESPASS
TIMBER. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the
unauthorized cutting of timber on the plaintiff's property.
The plaintiff sought and was awarded actual and punitive
damages. The actual damages were trebled under W. Va.
Code § 61-3-48a and the defendant argued that the punitive
damage award was improper because the treble damages
provision was already a punitive damage award. The court
noted that the legislative purpose of the treble damage
statute was to compensate more adequately the property
owner for the loss of the trees because the normal measure
of damages would not be sufficient after considering the
litigation costs to the plaintiff. The court held that the
plaintiff could receive punitive damages in an action for
treble damages because the treble damages were only
compensatory and not punitive. Bullman v. D & R
Lumber Co., 464 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Carroll v. Comm'r, 71 F.3d 1228 (6th Cir. 1995),
aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1994-229 (S corporation election) see p.
15 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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